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The Contribution of the Minimum Wage to U.S. Wage Inequality  
Over Three Decades: A Reassessment 
By DAVID H. AUTOR, ALAN MANNING, AND CHRISTOPHER L. SMITH* 
We reassess the effect of minimum wages on U.S. earnings inequality 
using additional decades of data and an IV strategy that addresses 
potential biases in prior work. We find that the minimum wage 
reduces inequality in the lower tail of the wage distribution, though 
by substantially less than previous estimates, suggesting that rising 
lower-tail inequality after 1980 primarily reflects underlying wage 
structure changes rather than an unmasking of latent inequality. 
These wage effects extend to percentiles where the minimum is 
nominally non‐binding, implying spillovers. We are unable to reject 
that these spillovers are due to reporting artifacts, however.  
The rapid expansion of earnings inequality throughout the U.S. wage distribution 
during the 1980s catalyzed a rich and voluminous literature seeking to trace this 
rise to fundamental forces of labor supply, labor demand, and labor market 
institutions. A broad conclusion of the ensuing literature is that while no single 
* Autor: Department of Economics, MIT, 50 Memorial Drive, E52-371, Cambridge, MA 02142, and NBER,  (e-mail: 
dautor@mit.edu); Manning: Centre for Economic Performance and Department of Economics, London School of 
Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom, (e-mail: a.manning@lse.ac.uk); Smith: Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, 20th & C Street, NW, Washington D.C. 20551, (e-mail: christopher.l.smith@frb.gov). 
Acknowledgments. We thank Daron Acemoglu, Joshua Angrist, Lawrence Katz, David Lee, Thomas Lemieux, Christina 
Patterson, Emmanuel Saez, Gary Solon, Steve Pischke and many seminar participants for valuable suggestions. We also 
thank David Lee and Arindrajit Dube for providing data on minimum wage laws by state. Any opinions and conclusions 
expressed herein are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence with other members of the research staff of the 
Federal Reserve or the Board of Governors. 
 
factor was solely responsible for rising inequality, the largest contributors included: 
(i) a slowdown in the supply of new college-graduates coupled with steadily rising 
demand for skills; (ii) falling union penetration, abetted by the sharp contraction of 
U.S. manufacturing employment early in the decade; and (iii) a 30 log point erosion 
in the real value of the federal minimum wage between 1979 and 1988 (see 
overviews in Katz and Murphy (1992), Katz and Autor (1999), Card and DiNardo 
(2002), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), Goldin and Katz (2008), Lemieux (2008), 
Acemoglu and Autor (2011)).  
An early and influential paper in this literature, Lee (1999), reached a markedly 
different conclusion. Exploiting cross-state variation in the gap between state 
median wages and the applicable federal or state minimum wage (the ‘effective 
minimum’), Lee estimated the share of the observed rise in wage inequality from 
1979 through 1988 that was due to the falling minimum rather than changes in 
underlying (‘latent’) wage inequality. Lee concluded that more than the entire rise 
of the 50/10 earnings differential between 1979 and 1988 was due to the falling 
federal minimum wage; had the minimum been constant throughout this period, 
observed wage inequality would have fallen rather than risen.1 Lee’s work built on 
the seminal analysis of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996, DFL hereafter), who 
highlighted the compressing effect of the minimum wage on the U.S. wage 
distribution prior to the 1980s. Distinct from Lee, however, DFL concluded that the 
eroding minimum explained at most 40 to 65 percent of the rise in 50/10 earnings 
inequality between 1979 and 1988, leaving considerable room for other 
fundamental factors, most importantly supply and demand.2  
1 Using cross-region rather than cross-state variation in the ‘bindingness’ of minimum wages, Teulings (2000 and 2003) 
reaches similar conclusions. Lemieux (2006) highlights the contribution of the minimum wage to the evolution of residual 
inequality. Mishel, Bernstein and Allegretto (2007, chapter 3) also offer an assessment of the minimum wage’s effect on 
wage inequality.  
2 See Tables III and V of DFL (1996). 
 
Surprisingly, there has been little research on the impact of the minimum wage 
on wage inequality since DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and Lee (1999), 
even though the data they use is now over 20 years old. One possible reason is that 
while lower-tail wage inequality rose dramatically in the 1980s, it has not exhibited 
much of a trend since then (see Figure 1A). But this does not make the last 20 years 
irrelevant; these extra years encompass three increases in the federal minimum 
wage and a much larger number of instances where state minimum wages exceeded 
the federal minimum wage. This additional variation will prove crucial in 
identifying the impact of minimum wages on wage inequality.  
[Insert Figure 1A and 1B here] 
In this paper, we reassess the evidence on the minimum wage’s impact on U.S. 
wage inequality with three specific objectives in mind. A first is to quantify how 
the numerous changes in state and federal minimum wages enacted in the two 
decades since DFL (1996) and Lee’s (1999) data window closed have shaped the 
evolution of inequality. A second is to understand why the minimum wage appears 
to compress inequality 50/10 inequality despite the fact that the minimum generally 
binds well below the 10th percentile. A third is to resolve what we see as a 
fundamental open question in the literature that was raised by Lee (1999). This 
question is not whether the falling minimum wage contributed to rising inequality 
in the 1980s but whether underlying inequality was in fact rising at all absent the 
‘unmasking’ effect of the falling minimum. Lee (1999) answered this question in 
the negative. And despite the incompatibility of this conclusion with the rest of the 
literature, it has not drawn reanalysis.  
We believe that the debate can now be cleanly resolved by combining a longer 
time window with a methodology that resolves first-order biases in existing 
literature. We begin by showing why OLS estimates of the impact of the ‘effective 
minimum’ on wage inequality are likely to be biased by measurement errors and 
transitory shocks that simultaneously affect both the dependent and independent 
variables. Following the approach introduced by Durbin (1954), we purge these 
biases by instrumenting the effective minimum wage with the legislated minimum 
(and its square), an idea pursued by Card, Katz and Krueger (1993) when studying 
the impact of the minimum wage on employment (rather than inequality).  
Our instrumental variables analysis finds that the impact of the minimum wage 
on inequality is economically consequential but substantially smaller than that 
reported by Lee (1999). The substantive difference comes from the estimation 
methodology. Additional years of data and state-level legislative variation in the 
minimum wage allow us to test (and reject) some of the identifying assumptions 
made by Lee (1999). In most specifications, we conclude that the decline in the real 
value of the minimum wage explains 30 to 40 percent of the rise in lower-tail wage 
inequality in the 1980s. Holding the real minimum wage at its lowest (least binding) 
level throughout the 1980s, we estimate that female 50/10 inequality would have 
risen by 11-15 log points, male inequality by approximately 2 log points, and 
pooled gender inequality by 7-8 log points. In other words, there was a substantial 
increase in underlying wage inequality in the 1980s.  
In revisiting Lee’s estimates, we document that our instrumental variables 
strategy—which relies on variation in statutory minimum wages across states and 
over time—does not perform well when limited to data only from the 1980s period. 
This is because between 1979 and 1985, only one state aside from Alaska adopted 
a minimum wage in excess of the federal minimum; the ten additional state 
adoptions that occurred through 1989 all took place between 1986 and 1989 
(Table 1). This provides insufficient variation to pin down a meaningful first-stage 
relationship between the legislated minimum wage and the effective minimum 
wage. By extending the estimation window to 1991 (as was also done by Lee, 
1999), we exploit the substantial federal minimum wage increase that took place 
between 1990 and 1991 to tighten these estimates; extending the sample further to 
2012 lends additional precision. We show that it would have been infeasible using 
data prior to 1991 to successfully estimate the effect of the minimum wage on the 
wage distribution. It is only with subsequent data on comovements in state wage 
distributions and the minimum wage that meaningful estimates can be obtained. 
Thus, the causal effect estimate that Lee sought to identify was only barely 
estimable within the confines of his sample (though not with the methods used).  
[Insert Table 1A and 1B here] 
Our finding of a modest but meaningful effect of the minimum wage on 10/50 
inequality leaves open a second puzzle: why did the minimum wage have any effect 
at all? Between 1979 and 2012, there is no year in which more than ten percent of 
male hours or aggregate hours were paid at or below the federal or applicable state 
minimum wage (See Figure 2 and Tables 1A and 1B, columns 4 and 8), and only 
five years in which more than ten percent of female hours were at or below the 
minimum wage. Thus, any impact of the minimum wage on 50/10 inequality among 
males or the pooled gender distribution must have arisen from spillovers, whereby 
the minimum wage must have raised the wages of workers earning above the 
minimum.3 Such spillovers are a potentially important and little understood effect 
of minimum wage laws, and we seek to understand why they arise. 
3 If there are disemployment effects, the minimum wage will have spillovers on the observed wage distribution even if 
no individual wage changes (see Lee, 1999, for a discussion of this).  The size of these spillovers will be related to the size 
of the disemployment effect.  Although the employment impact of the minimum wage remains a contentious issue (see, for 
example Card, Katz and Krueger (1993); Card and Krueger (2000); Neumark and Wascher (2000); and more recently, see 
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) and Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014)) most estimates are very small.  For example, 
the recent Congressional Budget Office (2014) report on the likely consequences of a 25% rise in the federal minimum wage 
from $7.25 to $9.00 used a conventional labor demand approach but concluded job losses would represent less than 0.1% of 
employment. This would cause only a trivial spillover effect.  In addition, we have explored how minimum wage related 
disemployment may affect our findings by limiting our sample to 25-64 year olds; because the studies that find 
disemployment effects generally find them concentrated among younger workers, focusing on older workers may limit the 
bias from disemployment. When we limit our sample in this way, we find that the effect of the minimum wage on lower tail 
inequality is somewhat smaller than for the full sample, consistent with a smaller fraction of the older sample earning at or 
below the minimum. However, using our preferred specification, the contribution of changes in the minimum wage to 
changes in inequality is qualitatively similar regardless of the sample. 
 
[Insert Figure 2  here] 
Distinct from prior literature, we explore a novel interpretation of these 
spillovers: measurement error. In particular, we assess whether the spillovers found 
in our samples, based on the Current Population Survey, may result from 
measurement artifacts. This can occur if a fraction of minimum wage workers 
report their wages inaccurately, leading to a hump in the wage distribution centered 
on the minimum wage rather than (or in addition to) a spike at the minimum. After 
bounding the potential magnitude of these measurement errors, we are unable to 
reject the hypothesis that the apparent spillover from the minimum wage to higher 
(non-covered) percentiles is spurious. That is, while the spillovers are present in 
the data, they may not be present in the distribution of wages actually paid. These 
results do not rule out the possibility of true spillovers. But they underscore that 
spillovers estimated with conventional household survey data sources must be 
treated with caution since they cannot necessarily be distinguished from 
measurement artifacts with available precision.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses data and sources of 
identification. Section II presents the measurement framework and estimates a set 
of causal effects estimates models that, like Lee (1999), explicitly account for the 
bite of the minimum wage in estimating its effect on the wage distribution. We 
compare parameterized OLS and 2SLS models and document the pitfalls that arise 
in the OLS estimation. Section III uses point estimates from the main regression 
models to calculate counterfactual changes in wage inequality, holding the real 
minimum wage constant. Section IV analyzes the extent to which apparent 
spillovers may be due to measurement error. The final section concludes. 
I. Changes in the federal minimum wage and variation in state minimum 
wages  
In July of 2007, the real value of the U.S. Federal minimum wage fell to its lowest 
point in over three decades, reflecting a nearly continuous decline from a 1979 high 
point, including two decade-long spans in which the minimum wage remained fixed 
in nominal terms—1981 through 1990, and 1997 through 2007. Perhaps responding 
to federal inaction, numerous states have over the past two decades legislated state 
minimum wages that exceed the federal level. At the end of the 1980s, 12 states’ 
minimum wages exceeded the federal level; by 2008, this number had reached 31 
(subsequently reduced to 15 by the 2009 federal minimum wage increase).4 
Consequently, the real value of the minimum wage applicable to the average worker 
in 2007 was not much lower than in 1997, and was significantly higher than if states 
had not enacted their own minimum wages. Moreover, the post-2007 federal 
increases brought the minimum wage faced by the average worker up to a real level 
not seen since the mid-1980s. Appendix Table 1 illustrates the extent of state 
minimum wage variation between 1979 and 2012. 
These differences in legislated minimum wages across states and over time are 
one of two sources of variation that we use to identify the impact of the minimum 
wage on the wage distribution. The second source of variation we use, following 
Lee (1999), is variation in the ‘bindingness’ of the minimum wage, stemming from 
the observation that a given legislated minimum wage should have a larger effect 
on the shape of the wage distribution in a state with a lower wage level. Table 1 
provides examples. In each year, there is significant variation in the percentile of 
the state wage distribution where the state or federal minimum wage “binds.” For 
4 Table 1 assigns each state the minimum wage that was in effect for the largest number of months in a calendar year. 
Because the 2009 federal minimum wage increase took effect in late July, it is not coded as exceeding most state minimums 
until 2010. 
 
instance, in 1979 the minimum wage bound at the 12th percentile of the female wage 
distribution for the median state, but it bound at the 5th percentile in Alaska and the 
28th percentile in Mississippi. This variation in the bite or bindingness of the 
minimum wage was due mainly to cross-state differences in wage levels in 1979, 
since only Alaska had a state minimum wage that exceeded the federal minimum. 
In later years, particularly during the 2000s, this variation was also due to 
differences in the value of state minimum wages. 
A. Sample and variable construction 
Our analysis uses the percentiles of states’ annual wage distributions as the 
primary outcomes of interest. We form these samples by pooling all individual 
responses from the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group 
(CPS MORG) for each year. We use the reported hourly wage for those who report 
being paid by the hour. Otherwise we calculate the hourly wage as weekly earnings 
divided by hours worked in the prior week. We limit the sample to individuals age 
18 through 64, and we multiply top-coded values by 1.5. We exclude self-employed 
individuals and those with wages imputed by the BLS. To reduce the influence of 
outliers, we Winsorize the top two percentiles of the wage distribution in each state, 
year, sex grouping (male, female or pooled) by assigning the 97th percentile value 
to the 98th and 99th percentiles. Using these individual wage data, we calculate all 
percentiles of state wage distributions by sex for 1979-2012, weighting individual 
observations by their CPS sampling weight multiplied by their weekly hours 
worked.5 For more details on our data construction, see the data appendix. 
Our primary analysis is performed at the state-year level, but minimum wages 
often change part way through the year. We address this issue by assigning the 
5 Following the approach introduced by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), now used widely in the wage inequality 
literature, we define percentiles based on the distribution of paid hours, thus giving equal weight to each paid hour worked. 
Our estimates are essentially unchanged if we weight by workers rather by worker hours.  
 
value of the minimum wage that was in effect for the longest time throughout the 
calendar year in a state and year. For those states and years in which more than one 
minimum wage was in effect for six months in the year, the maximum of the two 
is used. We have alternatively assigned the maximum of the minimum wage within 
a year as the applicable minimum wage. This leaves our conclusions unchanged. 
 
II. Reduced form estimation of minimum wage effects on the wage 
distribution  
A. General specification and OLS estimates 
The general model we estimate for the evolution of inequality at any point in the 
wage distribution (the difference between the log wage at the 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡ℎ percentile and the 
log of the median) for state 𝑠𝑠 in year 𝑡𝑡 is of the form: 
(1) 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝) − 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(50) = 
 𝛽𝛽1(𝑝𝑝)[𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(50)] + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑝𝑝)[𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(50)]2 + 
 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠0(𝑝𝑝) + 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠1(𝑝𝑝) × 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝) + 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎 (𝑝𝑝) 
 
In this equation, 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝) represents the log real wage at percentile 𝑝𝑝 in state 𝑠𝑠 at 
time 𝑡𝑡; time-invariant state effects are represented by 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠0(𝑝𝑝); state-specific trends 
are represented by 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠1(𝑝𝑝); time effects represented by 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝); and transitory effects 
represented by 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎 (𝑝𝑝), which we assume to be independent of the state and year 
effects and trends. Although our state effects and trends are likely to control for 
much of the economic fluctuations at state level, we also experimented with 
including the state-level unemployment rate as a control variable. This has virtually 
no impact on the estimated coefficients in equation (1) for any of our samples. 
In equation (1), 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 is the log minimum wage for that state-year. We follow Lee 
(1999) in both defining the bindingness of the minimum wage to be the log 
difference between the minimum wage and the median (Lee refers to this as the 
effective minimum) and in modeling the impact of the minimum wage to be 
quadratic. The quadratic term is important to capture the idea that a change in the 
minimum wage is likely to have more impact on the wage distribution where it is 
more binding.6 By differentiating (1) we have that the predicted impact of a change 
in the minimum wage on a percentile is given by 𝛽𝛽1(𝑝𝑝) + 2𝛽𝛽2(𝑝𝑝)[𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(50)]. 
Inspection of this expression shows how our specification captures the idea that the 
minimum wage will have a larger effect when it is high relative to the median. 
Our preferred strategy for estimating (1) is to include state fixed effects and trends 
and to instrument the minimum wage.7 But we start by presenting OLS estimates 
of (1).8 Column 1 of Tables 2A, and 2B reports estimates of this specification. We 
report the marginal effects of the effective minimum for selected percentiles when 
estimated at the weighted average of the effective minimum over all states and all 
years between 1979 and 2012. In the final row we also report an estimate of the 
effect on the variance, though the upper tail will heavily influence this estimate. 
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of these estimated marginal effects for 
all percentiles. In all three samples (males, females, pooled), there is a significant 
estimated effect of the minimum wage on the lower tail but, rather worryingly, there 
is also a large positive relationship between the effective minimum wage and upper 
6 In this formulation, a more binding minimum wage is a minimum wage that is closer to the median, resulting in a higher 
(less negative) effective minimum wage. Since the log wage distribution has greater mass towards its center than at its tail, 
a 1 log point rise in the minimum wage affects a larger fraction of wages when the minimum lies at the 40th percentile of the 
distribution than when it lies at the 1st percentile. 
7 Our primary specification does not control for other state-level controls. When we include state-year unemployment 
rates to proxy for heterogeneous shocks to a state’s labor market, however, the coefficients on the minimum wage variables 
are essentially unchanged. 
8 Strictly speaking our OLS estimates are weighted least squares and our IV estimates weighted two-stage least squares. 
 
tail inequality. This suggests there is some bias in these estimates. This problem 
also occurs when we estimate the model with first-differences in column 2. 
[Insert Table 2A and 2B, Figure 3 here] 
In discussing the possible causes of bias in estimates, it is helpful to consider the 
following model for the median log wage for state s in year t:  
(2) 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(50) = 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠0 + 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠1×𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇 + 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇  
Here, the median wage for the state is a function of a state effect, 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠0, a state 
trend, 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠1, a common year effect, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡
𝜇𝜇, and a transitory effect, 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝜇𝜇 . With this setup, 
OLS estimation of (1) will be biased if cov�𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇 , 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎 (𝑝𝑝)� is non-zero because the 
median is used in the construction of the effective minimum; that is, transitory 
fluctuations in state wage medians are correlated with the gap between the state 
wage median and other wage percentiles. Is this bias likely to be present in practice? 
One would naturally expect that transitory shocks to the median do not translate 
one-for-one to other percentiles. If, plausibly, the effects dissipate as one moves 
further from the median, this would generate bias due to the non-zero correlation 
between shocks to the median wage and measured inequality throughout the 
distribution. This implies that we would expect cov�𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇 , 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎 (𝑝𝑝)� < 0 and that this 
covariance would attenuate as one considers percentiles further from the median. 
How does this covariance affect estimates of equation (1)? This depends on the 
covariance of the effective minimum wage terms with the errors in the equation. 
The natural assumption is that cov�𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(50),𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(50)� < 0, that is, even 
after allowing for the fact that high wage states may have a state minimum higher 
than the federal minimum, the minimum wage is less binding in high wage states. 
Combining this with the assumption that cov�𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇 , 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎 (𝑝𝑝)� < 0 leads to the 
prediction that OLS estimation of (1) leads to upward bias in the estimate of the 
impact of minimum wages on inequality in both the lower and upper tail.  
We will address this problem by applying instrumental variables to purge biases 
caused by measurement error and other transitory shocks, following the approach 
introduced by Durbin (1954). We instrument the observed effective minimum and 
its square using an instrument set that consists of: 1) the log of the real statutory 
minimum wage, 2) the square of the log of the real minimum wage, and 3) the 
interaction between the log minimum wage and average log median real wage for 
the state over the sample period. In this IV specification, identification in (1) for 
the linear term in the effective minimum wage comes entirely from the variation in 
the statutory minimum wage, and identification for the quadratic term comes from 
the inclusion of the square of the log statutory minimum wage and the interaction 
term.9 As there are always time effects included in our estimation, all the 
identifying variation in the statutory minimum comes from the state-specific 
minimum wages, which we assume to be exogenous to state wage levels or 
inequality.10 Our second instrument is the square of the predicted value for the 
effective minimum from the regression outlined above, and relies on the same 
identifying assumptions (exogeneity of the statutory minimum wage).  
Column 3 of Tables 2A and 2B report the estimates when we instrument the 
effective minimum in the way we have described. The first-stages for these 
9 To see why the interaction is important to include, expand the square of the effective minimum wage, log(min)-log(p50), 
which yields three terms, one of which is the interaction of log(min) and log(p50). We have also tried replacing the square 
and interaction terms with the square of the predicted value for the effective minimum, where the predicted value is derived 
from a regression of the effective minimum on the log statutory minimum, state and time fixed effects, and state trends 
(similar to an approach suggested by Wooldridge, 2002; section 9.5.2). 2SLS results using this alternative instrument are 
virtually identical to the strategy outlined in the main text. In general, using the statutory minimum as an instrument is similar 
in spirit to the approach taken by Card, Katz and Krueger (1993) in their analysis of the employment effects of the minimum 
wage. 
10 We follow almost all of the existing literature and assume the state level minimum wages are exogenous to other 
factor affecting the state-level wage distribution once we have controlled for state fixed effects and trends.  A priori, any 
bias is unclear e.g. rising inequality might generate a demand for higher minimum wages as might economic conditions 
favorable to minimum wage workers.  The long lags in the political process surrounding rises in the minimum wages 
makes it unlikely there is much response to contemporaneous economic conditions. 
 
regressions are reported in Appendix Table 3. For all samples, the three instruments 
are jointly highly significant and pass standard diagnostic tests for weak 
instruments (e.g., Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002).  Compared to column 1 the 
estimated impacts of the minimum wage in the lower tail are reduced, especially 
above the 10th percentile. This is consistent with what we have argued is the most 
plausible direction of bias in the OLS estimate in column 1. And, for all three 
samples, the estimated effect in the upper tail is now small and insignificantly 
different from zero, again consistent with the IV strategy reducing bias in the 
predicted direction.11  
For robustness, we also estimate these models in first differences. Column 4 
shows the results from first-differenced regressions that include state and year fixed 
effects, instrumenting the endogenous differenced variables using differenced 
analogues to the instruments described above. 12 Figure 4a shows the results for all 
percentiles from the levels IV specifications; Figure 4b shows the results from the 
first-differenced IV specifications. Qualitatively, the first-differenced regressions 
are quite similar to the levels regressions, although they imply slightly larger effects 
of the minimum wage at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
[Insert Figures 4A and 4B here] 
Our 2SLS estimates find that the minimum wage affects lower-tail inequality up 
through the 25th percentile for women, up through the 10th percentile for men, and 
up through approximately the 15th percentile for the pooled wage distribution. A 10 
log point increase in the effective minimum wage reduces 50/10 inequality by 
approximately 2 log points for women, by no more than 0.5 log points for men, and 
11 These findings are essentially unchanged if we use higher order state time trends.  
12 The instruments for the first-differenced analogue are ∆𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 and ∆(𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤(50)𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)2� , where ∆𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 represents the annual 
change in the log of the legislated minimum wage, and ∆(𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤(50)𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)2�  represents the change in the square of the 
predicted value for the effective minimum wage. 
 
by roughly 1.5 log points for the pooled distribution. These estimates are less than 
half as large as those found by the baseline OLS specification, and are considerably 
smaller than those reported by Lee (1999). What accounts for this qualitative 
difference in findings? The dissimilarity could stem either from differences in 
specification and estimation or from the additional years of data available for our 
analysis.  We consider both factors in turn, and show that the first—differences in 
specification and estimation—is fundamental. 
 
B. Reconciling with Literature: Methods or Time Period? 
Lee (1999) estimates equation (1) by OLS and his preferred specification 
excludes the state fixed effects and trends that we have included.13 Column 5 of 
Tables 2a and 2b and Figure 5 shows what happens when we estimate this model 
on our longer sample period. Similar to Lee, we find large and statistically 
significant effects of the minimum wage on the lower percentiles of the wage 
distribution that extend throughout all percentiles below the median for the male, 
female, and pooled wage distributions, and are much larger than the effects in our 
preferred specifications. Also note that, with the exception of the male estimates, 
the upper tail ‘effects’ are small and insignificantly different from zero, which 
might be considered a necessary condition for the results to be credible estimates 
of the impact of the minimum wage on wage inequality at any point in the 
distribution.  
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
13 We include time effects in all of our estimation, as does Lee (1999). We estimate the model separately for each p (from 
1 to 99), and impose no restrictions on the coefficients or error structure across equations.  
 
 
These estimates are likely to suffer from serious biases, however. If state fixed 
effects and trends are omitted from the specification of (1), estimates of minimum 
wage effects on wage inequality will be biased if (𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠0(𝑝𝑝),𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠1(𝑝𝑝)) is correlated with (𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠0, 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠1), that is, state log median wage levels and latent state log wage inequality 
are correlated. Lee (1999) is very clear that his specification relies on the 
assumption of a zero correlation between the level of median wages and inequality. 
This assumption can be tested if one has a measure of inequality that is unlikely to 
be affected by the level of the minimum wage. For this purpose we use 60/40 
inequality, that is, the difference in the log of the 60th and 40th percentiles. Given 
that the minimum wage never binds very far above the 10th percentile of the wage 
distribution over our sample period, we feel comfortable assuming that the 
minimum wage has no impact on percentiles 40 through 60. Under this maintained 
hypothesis, 60/40 inequality serves as valid proxy for the underlying inequality of 
a state’s wage distribution.  
To assess whether either the level or trend of state latent inequality is correlated 
with average state wage levels or their trends, we estimate state-level regressions 
of average 60/40 inequality and estimated trends in 60/40 inequality on average 
median wages and trends in median wages. Figures 6a and 6b depict scatter plots 
of these regressions, with regression results reported in Appendix Table 3. Figure 
6a depicts the cross-state relationship between the average log(p60)-log(p40) and 
the average log(p50) for each of our three samples. Figure 6b depicts the cross-state 
relationship between the trends in the two measures. In all cases but the male trends 
plot (panel B of figure 6b), there is a strong, positive visual relationship between 
the two—and, even for the male trend scatter, there is, in fact, a statistically 
significant positive relationship between the trends in the log(p60)-log(p40) and 
log(p50). 
[Insert Figures 6A and 6B here] 
The finding of a positive correlation between underlying inequality and the state 
median implies there is likely to be omitted variable bias from the exclusion of state 
fixed effects and trends—specifically, an upward bias to the estimated minimum 
wage effect in the lower tail and, simultaneously, a downward bias in the upper tail. 
To see why, note that higher wage states have lower (more negative) effective 
minimum wages (defined as the log gap between the legislated minimum and the 
state median), and the results from table 3 imply that these states also have higher 
levels of latent inequality; thus they will have a more negative value of the left-
hand side variable in our main estimating equation (1) for percentiles below the 
median, and a more positive value for percentiles above the median. Since the state 
median enters the right-hand side expression for the effective minimum wage with 
a negative sign, estimates of the relationship between the effective minimum and 
wage inequality will be upward-biased in the lower tail and downward-biased in 
the upper tail.  
Combined with our discussion above on potential biases stemming from the 
correlation between the transitory error components on both sides of equation (1), 
which leads to an upward bias on the coefficient on the effective minimum wage 
in both lower and upper tails, we infer that these two sources of bias reinforce each 
other in the lower tail, likely leading to an overestimate of the impact of the 
minimum wage on lower tail inequality. Simultaneously, they have countervailing 
effects on the upper tail. Thus our finding in the fifth column of Table 2 of a 
relatively weak relationship between the effective minimum wage and upper tail 
inequality (for the female and pooled samples) may arise because these two 
countervailing sources of bias largely offset one another for upper tail estimates. 
But since these biases are reinforcing in the lower tail of the distribution, the 
absence of an upper tail correlation is not sufficient evidence for the absence of 
lower tail bias, implying that Lee’s (1999) preferred specification may suffer from 
upward bias.  
The original work assessing the impact of the minimum wage on rising U.S. wage 
inequality—including DFL (1996), Lee (1999) and Teulings (2000, 2003)—used 
data from 1979 through the late 1980s or early 1990s. Our primary estimates exploit 
an additional 21 years of data. Does this longer sample frame make a substantive 
difference? Figure 7 answers this question by plotting estimates of marginal effects 
of the effect minimum wage on percentiles of the pooled male and female wage 
distribution (as per column 3 of Table 2) for each of three time periods: 1979-1989, 
when there was little state-level variation in the minimum wage; 1979-1991, 
incorporating an additional two years in which numerous states raised their 
minimum wage; and 1979-2012. Panel A of Figure 7 reveals that our IV strategy—
which relies on variation in statutory minimum wages across states and over time—
does not perform well when limited to data only from the 1980s period: the point 
estimates are enormous relative to both OLS estimates and 2SLS estimates; and the 
confidence bands are extremely large (note that the scale in the figure runs from -
25 to 25, more than an order of magnitude larger than even the largest point 
estimates in Table 2). This lack of statistical significance is not surprising in light 
of the small number of policy changes in this period: between 1979 and 1985, only 
one state aside from Alaska adopted a minimum wage in excess of the federal 
minimum; the ten additional adoptions through 1989 all occurred between 1986 
and 1989 (Table 1). Consequently, when calculating counterfactuals below, we 
apply marginal effects estimates obtained using additional years of data.  
[Insert Figures 7A, 7B, and 7C here] 
By extending the estimation window to 1991 in panel B of Figure 7 (as was also 
done by Lee, 1999), we exploit the substantial federal minimum wage increase that 
took place between 1990 and 1991. This federal increase generated numerous 
cross-state contrasts since nine states had by 1989 raised their minimums above the 
1989 federal level and below the 1991 federal level (and an additional three raised 
their minimum to $4.25, which would be the level of the 1991 federal minimum 
wage). As panel B underscores, including these two additional years of data 
dramatically reduces the standard errors around our estimates, though the estimated 
marginal effects on particular percentile are still quite noisy. Adding data for the 
full sample through 2012 (panel C of Figure 7) reduces the standard errors further 
and helps smooth out estimated marginal effects across percentiles. 
Comparing across the three panels of Figure 7 reveals that it would have been 
infeasible using data prior to 1991 to successfully estimate the effect of the 
minimum wage on the wage distribution. It is only with subsequent data on 
comovements in state wage distributions and the minimum wage that more accurate 
estimates can be obtained. For this reason, our primary counterfactual estimates of 
changes in inequality rely on coefficient estimates from the full sample. We also 
discuss below the robustness of our substantive findings to the use of shorter sample 
windows (1979-1989 and 1979-1991). 
III. Counterfactual estimates of changes in inequality  
How much of the expansion in lower-tail wage inequality since 1979 can be 
explained by the declining minimum wage? Following Lee (1999), we present 
reduced form counterfactual estimates of the change in latent wage inequality 
absent the decline in the minimum wage—that is, the change in wage inequality 
that would have been observed had the minimum wage been held at a constant real 
benchmark. These reduced form counterfactual estimates do not distinguish 
between mechanical and spillover effects of the minimum wage, a topic that we 
analyze next. We consider counterfactual changes over two periods: 1979-1989 
(which captures the large widening of lower-tail income inequality over the 1980s) 
and 1979-2012. 
To estimate changes in latent wage inequality, Lee (1999) proposes the following 
simple procedure. For each observation in the dataset, calculate its rank in its 
respective state-year wage distribution. Then, adjust each wage by the quantity:  
(3)  ∆𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝) = ?̂?𝛽1(𝑝𝑝)�𝑡𝑡�𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏0 − 𝑡𝑡�𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏1� + ?̂?𝛽2(𝑝𝑝)�𝑡𝑡�𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏02 − 𝑡𝑡�𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏12 �,  
  
where 𝑡𝑡�𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏1 is the observed end-of period effective minimum in state s in some 
year 𝜏𝜏1, 𝑡𝑡�𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏0 is the corresponding beginning-of-period effective minimum in 𝜏𝜏0, 
and ?̂?𝛽1(𝑝𝑝), ?̂?𝛽2(𝑝𝑝) are point estimates from the OLS and 2SLS estimates in Table 2 
(columns 1, 4, or 5).14 We pool these adjusted wage observations to form a 
counterfactual national wage distribution, and we compare changes in inequality in 
the simulated distribution to those in the observed distribution.15 We compute 
standard errors by bootstrapping the estimates within the state-year panel.16 
The first column of the upper panel of Table 3 shows that between 1979 and 
1989, the female 50/10 log wage ratio increased by nearly 25 log points. Applying 
the coefficient estimates on the effective minimum and its square obtained using 
the 2SLS model fit to the female wage data for 1979 through 2012 (column 2 of 
panel A), we calculate that had the minimum wage been constant at its real 1989 
level throughout this period, female 50/10 inequality would counterfactually have 
risen by 11.3 log points. Using the first differences specification (column 3), we 
estimate a counterfactual rise of 15.1 log points. Thus, the minimum wage can 
14 So, for example, taking 𝜏𝜏0 = 1979 and 𝜏𝜏1 = 1989, and subtracting ∆𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝  from each observed wage in 1979 would 
adjust the 1979 distribution to its counterfactual under the realized effective minima in 1989. 
15 We use states’ observed median wages when calculating 𝑡𝑡�  rather than the national median deflated by the price index 
as was done by Lee (1999). This choice has no substantive effect on the results but appears most consistent with the 
identifying assumptions.  
16 Our bootstrap takes states as the sampling unit, and thus we start by drawing 50 states with replacement from the state-
year-percentile dataset. We next estimate the models in Tables 2a and 2b for the selected states using the percentile estimates 
and sample weights from the full dataset and, finally, apply the coefficients to the full CPS individual-level sample to 
calculate the counterfactual in equation (3). Table 3 reports the mean and standard deviation of 1,000 replications of this 
counterfactual exercise.  
 
explain between 40 and 55 percent of the observed rise in equality, with the 
complement due to a rise in underlying inequality. These are non-trivial effects, of 
course, and they confirm, in accordance with the visual evidence in Figure 1, that 
the falling minimum wage contributed meaningfully to rising female lower-tail 
inequality during the 1980s and early 1990s.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The OLS estimates preferred by Lee (1999) find a substantially larger role for the 
minimum wage, however. Using the OLS model fit to the female wage data for 
1979 through 2012 (column 4 of panel A), we calculate that female 50/10 inequality 
would counterfactually have risen by only 2.9 log points. Applying the coefficient 
estimates for only the 1979-1991 period (column 5), female 50/10 inequality would 
have risen by 4.3 log points. Thus, consistent with Lee (1999), the OLS estimate 
implies that the decline in the real minimum wage can account for the bulk (all but 
3 to 4 of 25 log points) of the expansion of lower tail female wage inequality in this 
period.  
The second and third rows of Table 3 calculate the effect of the minimum wage 
on male and pooled gender inequality. Here, the discrepancy between IV and OLS-
based counterfactuals is even more pronounced. 2SLS models indicate that the 
minimum wage makes a very modest contribution to the rise in male wage 
inequality and explains only about 30 to 40 percent of the rise in pooled gender 
inequality. By contrast, OLS estimates imply that the minimum wage more than 
fully explains both the rise in male 50/10 inequality and the rise in pooled 50/10 
inequality between 1979 and 1989.  
Despite their substantial discrepancy with the OLS models, the 2SLS estimates 
appear highly plausible. Figure 2 shows that the minimum wage was nominally 
non-binding for males throughout the sample period, with fewer than 6 percent of 
all male wages falling at or below the relevant minimum wage in any given year. 
For the pooled gender distribution, the minimum wage had somewhat more bite, 
with a bit more than 8 percent of all hours paid at or below the minimum in the first 
few years of the sample. But this is modest relative to its position in the female 
distribution, where 9 to 13 percent of wages were at or below the relevant minimum 
in the first five years of the sample. Consistent with these facts, 2SLS estimates 
indicate that the falling minimum wage generated a sizable increase in female wage 
inequality, a modest increase in pooled gender inequality, and a minimal increase 
in male wage inequality.  
Panel B of Table 3 calculates counterfactual (minimum wage constant) changes 
in inequality over the full sample interval of 1979-2012. In all cases, the 
contribution of the minimum wage to rising inequality is smaller when estimated 
using 2SLS in place of OLS models, and its impacts are substantial for females, 
modest for the pooled distribution, and negligible for males. 
Figure 8 and the top panel of Figure 9 provide a visual comparison of observed 
and counterfactual changes in male, female and pooled-gender wage inequality 
during the critical period of 1979 through 1989, during which time the minimum 
wage remained nominally fixed while lower-tail inequality rose rapidly for all 
groups. As per Lee (1999), the OLS counterfactuals depicted in these plots suggest 
that the minimum wage explains essentially all (or more than all) of the rise in 50/10 
inequality in the female, male and pooled-gender distributions during this period. 
The 2SLS counterfactuals place this contribution at a far more modest level. The 
counterfactual series for males, for example, is indistinguishable from the observed 
series, implying that the minimum wage made almost no contribution to the rise in 
male inequality in this period. We see a similarly pronounced discrepancy between 
OLS and 2SLS models in the lower panel of Figure 9, which plots observed and 
counterfactual wages change in the pooled gender distribution for the full sample 
period of 1979 through 2012 (again holding the minimum wage at its 1988 value).17  
[Insert Figures 8A, 8B, 9A, and 9B here] 
Consistent with earlier literature, our estimates confirm that the falling minimum 
wage contributed to the growth of lower tail inequality growth during the 1980s. 
But while prior work, most notably Lee (1999), finds that the falling minimum fully 
accounts for this growth, this result appears strongly upward biased by violation of 
the identifying assumptions on which it rests. Purging this bias, we find that the 
minimum wage can explain at most half—and generally less than half—of the 
growth of lower-tail inequality during the 1980s. Over the full three decades 
between 1979 and 2012, at least 60 percent of the growth of pooled 50/10 
inequality, 50 percent of female 50/10 inequality, and 90% of male 50/10 inequality 
is due to changes in the underlying wage structure.  
IV. The limits of inference: Distinguishing spillovers from measurement 
error  
Federal and state minimum wages were nominally non-binding at the 10th 
percentile of the wage distribution throughout most of the sample (Figure 2); in 
fact, there is only one three year interval (1979 to 1983), when more than ten 
percent of hours paid were at or below the minimum wage (Table 1)—and this was 
only the case for females. Yet our main estimates imply that the minimum wage 
modestly compressed both male and pooled-gender 50/10 wage inequality during 
17 We have repeated these counterfactuals using coefficient estimates from years 1979 through 1991 (using the additional 
cross-state identification offered by the increases in the federal minimum wage over this period) rather than the full 1979-
2012 sample period. The counterfactual estimates from this exercise are somewhat smaller but largely consistent with the 
full sample, both during the critical period of 1979 through 1989 and during other intervals.  
 
the 1980s. This implies that the minimum wage had spillover effects onto 
percentiles above where it binds. 
While these spillovers might arise from several economic forces such as 
tournament wage structures or positional income concerns, a mundane but 
nonetheless plausible alternative explanation is measurement error. To see why, 
consider a case where the minimum wage is set at the 5th percentile of the latent 
wage distribution and has no spillover effects. However, due to misreporting, the 
spike in the wage distribution at the true minimum wage is surrounded by a 
measurement error cloud that extends from the 1st through the 9th percentiles. If the 
legislated minimum wage were to rise to the 9th percentile and measurement error 
were to remain constant, the rise in the minimum wage would compress the 
measured wage distribution up to the 13th percentile, thus reducing the measured 
50/10 wage gap. This apparent spillover would be a feature of the data, but it would 
not be a feature of the true wage distribution.18  
In this final section of the paper, we quantify the possible bias wrought by these 
measurement spillovers. Specifically, we ask whether we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the minimum wage only affects the earnings of those earning at or 
below the minimum—in which case, the apparent spillovers would be consistent 
with measurement error.19 Since this analysis relies in part on some strong 
assumption, it should be thought of as an illustrative exercise designed to give some 
idea of magnitudes rather than a dispositive test. 
18 This argument holds in reverse for a decline in the minimum wage.  
19 Note that we are not testing whether an apparent spillover for a particular percentile, for a particular state/year, is 
attributable to measurement error—we are testing whether, on average, all of the observed spillovers could be attributable to 
measurement error. 
 
A. General set-up 
We use a simple measurement error model to test the hypothesis.20 Denote by 𝑝𝑝∗ 
a percentile of the latent wage distribution (i.e. the percentile absent measurement 
error and without a minimum wage), and write the latent wage associated with it as 
𝑤𝑤∗(𝑝𝑝∗). Assuming that there are only direct effects of the minimum wage (i.e., no 
true spillovers and no disemployment effects), then the true wage at percentile 𝑝𝑝∗ 
will be given by: 
(4) 𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝∗) ≡ max[𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚,𝑤𝑤∗(𝑝𝑝)], 
where 𝑤𝑤∗(𝑝𝑝) is the true latent log wage percentile and 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚 the log of the minimum 
wage.  
Now, allow for the possibility of measurement error, so that for a worker at true 
wage percentile 𝑝𝑝∗, we observe: 
(5) 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝∗) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is an error term with density function 𝑔𝑔(𝜀𝜀), which we assume to be 
independent of the true wage. We will make use of the following result proved in 
section B of the Appendix: 
 
Result 1: Under the null hypothesis of no actual spillovers, no disemployment and 
measurement error independent of the true wage, the elasticity of wages at an 
observed percentile with respect to the minimum wage is equal to the fraction of 
people at that observed percentile whose true wage is equal to the minimum. 
20 In the following discussion, it will be useful to distinguish between three distinct wage distributions: 1) the latent wage 
distribution, which is the wage distribution in the absence of a minimum wage and measurement error; 2) the true wage 
distribution, which is the wage distribution in the absence of measurement error but allowing for minimum wage effects; and 
3) the observed wage distribution, which is the wage distribution allowing for measurement error and a minimum wage (i.e. 
what is measured from CPS data). 
 
 The intuition for this result is straightforward: if the minimum wage rises by 10 
percent, and 10 percent of workers at a given percentile are paid the minimum wage 
and only these have their wage affected, the observed wage at that percentile will 
rise by 1 percent.  
This result has a simple corollary (proved in section C of the Appendix) that we 
also use in the estimation below: 
 
Result 2: Under the null hypothesis of no true spillovers, the elasticity of the overall 
mean log wage with respect to the minimum wage is equal to the fraction of the 
wage distribution that is truly paid the minimum wage—that is, the size of the true 
spike. 
 
This result follows from the fact that all individuals who are truly paid the 
minimum wage must appear somewhere in the observed wage distribution. And of 
course, changes at any point in the distribution also change the mean. Thus, if the 
true spike at the minimum wage comprises 10 percent of the mass of the true wage 
distribution, a 10 percent rise in the minimum will increase the true and observed 
mean wage by 1 percent. Note that no distributional assumptions about 
measurement error are needed for either Result 1 or Result 2 other than the 
assumption that the measurement error distribution is independent of wage levels. 
The practical value of Result 2 is that we can readily estimate the effect of 
changes in the minimum wage on the mean using the methods developed above. In 
practice, we estimate a version of equation (1), using as the dependent variable the 
average log real wage. On the right hand side, we include the effective minimum 
wage and its square as endogenous regressors (and instrument for them using the 
same instruments as in the earlier analysis), state and year fixed effects, state time 
trends, and the log of the median (to control for shocks to the wage level of the state 
that are unrelated to the minimum wage, assuming that any spillovers do not extend 
through the median). We plot these estimates in the three panels of Figure 10, 
corresponding to females, males, and the pooled wage distribution. The dashed line 
in each panel represents the marginal effect of the minimum on the mean by year, 
taking the weighted average across all states for each year. Under the null 
hypothesis of no true spillovers, this estimate of the effect the minimum on the 
mean is an estimate of the size of the true spike. Under the alternative hypothesis 
that true spillovers are present, the marginal effect on the mean will exceed the size 
of the true spike. To distinguish these alternatives requires a second, independent 
estimate of the size of the true spike.  
B. Estimating measurement error 
We develop a second estimate of the magnitude of the true spike by directly 
estimating a model of measurement error and using this estimate to infer the size of 
the spike absent this error. We exploit the fact that under the assumption of full 
compliance with the minimum wage, all observations found below the minimum 
wage must be observations with measurement error.21 Of course, wage 
observations below the minimum can only provide information on individuals with 
negative measurement error, since minimum wage earners with positive 
measurement error must have an observed wage above the minimum. Thus, a key 
identifying assumption is that the measurement error is symmetric, that is 𝑔𝑔(𝜀𝜀) =
𝑔𝑔(−𝜀𝜀).  
21 There are surely some individuals who report sub-minimum wage wages and actually receive sub-minimum wages. 
The largest (but not the only) group is probably tipped workers, who in many states can legally receive a sub-minimum 
hourly wage as long as tips push their total hourly income above the minimum. For instance, in 2009, about 55 percent of 
those who reported their primary occupation as waiter or waitress reported an hourly wage less than the applicable minimum 
wage for their state, and about 17 percent of all observed sub-minimum wages were from waiters and waitresses. If we treat 
the wages of these individuals as measurement error, we will clearly over-state the extent of misreporting. We circumvent 
this problem by conducting the measurement/spillover analysis on a sample that excludes employees in low-paying 
occupations that commonly receive tips or commission. These are: food service jobs, barbers and hairdressers, retail 
salespersons and telemarketers.  
 
In what follows, we use maximum likelihood to estimate the distribution of 
wages below the minimum and the fraction of workers at and above the minimum 
(for the sample of non-tipped workers as described in footnote 21). We assume that 
the ‘true’ wage distribution only has a mass point at the minimum wage so that 
𝑤𝑤∗(𝑝𝑝∗) has a continuous derivative. We also assume that the measurement error 
distribution only has a mass point at zero so that there is a non-zero probability of 
observing the ‘true’ wage. (Without this assumption, we would be unable to 
rationalize the existence of a spike in the observed wage distribution at the 
minimum wage.) Denote the probability that the wage is correctly reported as 𝛾𝛾. 
For those who report an error-ridden wage, we will use, in a slight departure from 
previous notation, 𝑔𝑔(𝜀𝜀) to denote the distribution of the error. 
With these assumptions, the size of the spike in the observed wage distribution at 
the minimum wage, which we denote by 𝑝𝑝�, is equal to the true spike times the 
probability that the wage is correctly reported: 
(6) 𝑝𝑝� = 𝛾𝛾?̂?𝑝. 
 
Hence, using an estimate of 𝛾𝛾, we can estimate the magnitude of the true spike as 
?̂?𝑝 ≈ 𝑝𝑝�/𝛾𝛾�.22 
C. Finding: Spillovers cannot be distinguished from measurement error 
We use the following two-step procedure to estimate 𝛾𝛾. Under the assumption 
that the latent log wage distribution is normal with mean 𝜇𝜇 and variance 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤2  and 
that the measurement error distribution is normal with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2, 
we use observations from the top part of the wage distribution—which we assume 
22 The assumption on the absence of mass points in the true wage distribution and the error distribution mean that the 
group of workers who are not paid the minimum but, by chance, have an error which makes them appeared to be paid the 
minimum is of measure zero and so can be ignored. 
 
are unaffected by changes to the minimum wage—to estimate the median and 
variance of the observed latent wage distribution, allowing for variation across state 
and time.23 Equipped with these estimates, we use the observed fraction of workers 
who are paid below the minimum for each state and year to estimate (𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2, 𝛾𝛾) by 
maximum likelihood. We assume that (𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2, 𝛾𝛾) vary over time but not across states. 
Exact details of our procedure can be found in section D of the Appendix. As 
previously noted, we perform this analysis on a sample that excludes individuals 
from lower-paying occupations that tend to earn tips or commission. 
Estimates of 𝛾𝛾 for males, females, and the pooled sample (not shown) generally 
find that the probability of correct reporting is around 80 percent, and mostly varies 
from between 70 to 90 percent over time (though is estimated to be around 65 to 
70 percent in the early 1980s for females and the pooled distribution). We combine 
this estimate with the observed spike to get an estimate of the ‘true’ spike in each 
period, though this will be an estimate of the size of the true spike only for the 
estimation sample of workers in non-tipped occupations.  
This leaves us in need of an estimate of the ‘true’ spike for the tipped occupations. 
Given the complexity of the state laws surrounding the minimum wage for tipped 
employees, we do not attempt to model these subminimum wages. Rather we 
simply note that the spike for tipped employees must be between zero and one, and 
we use this observation to bound the ‘true’ spike for the entire workforce. Because 
the fraction of workers in tipped occupations is small, these bounds are relatively 
tight. 
Figure 10 compares these bounds with the earlier estimates of the ‘true’ spike 
based on the elasticity of the mean with respect to the minimum in each year. Under 
the null hypothesis that the minimum wage has no true spillovers, the effect on the 
23 This procedure does not account for the type of measurement error induced by heaping of observations around whole 
numbers (e.g., $5.50), so the estimates that follow should be treated as suggestive. 
 
mean should equal the size of the ‘true’ spike. And indeed, the estimated mean 
effect lies within the bounds of the estimated ‘true’ spike in almost all years. We 
are accordingly unable to reject the hypothesis that the apparent effect of the 
minimum wage on percentiles above the minimum is a measurement error spillover 
rather than a true spillover. 
[Insert Figure 10 here] 
This analysis rests on some strong assumptions so should not be regarded as 
definitive. But if we tentatively accept this null, it has the important implication 
that changes in the minimum wage may only affect those who are paid the 
minimum and the apparent effects further up the wage distribution are the 
consequences of measurement error. A conclusive answer would require better 
wage data, ideally administrative payroll data.24 
 
V. Conclusion  
This paper offers a reassessment of the impact of the minimum wage on the wage 
distribution by using a longer panel than was available to previous studies, 
incorporating many additional years of data and including significantly more 
variation in state minimum wages, and using an econometric approach that purges 
confounding correlations between state wage levels and wage variances that we 
find bias earlier estimates. Under our preferred model specification and estimation 
sample, we estimate that between 1979 and 1989, the decline in the real value of 
the minimum wage is responsible for 30 to 55 percent of the growth of lower tail 
24 In Dube, Guiliano and Leonard’s (2015) study of the impact of wage increases on employment and quit behavior at a 
large retail firm, the authors note that this firm implemented sizeable wage spillovers as a matter of corporate policy—with 
minimum wage increases automatically leading to raises among workers earning as much as 15 percent above the new 
minimum. 
 
inequality in the female, male, and pooled wage distributions (as measured by the 
differential between the log of the 50th and 10th percentiles). Similarly, calculations 
indicate that during the full sample period of 1979 – 2012, the declining minimum 
wage made a meaningful contribution to female inequality, a modest contribution 
to pooled gender inequality, and a negligible contribution to male lower tail 
inequality. In net, these estimates indicate a substantially smaller role for the U.S. 
minimum in the rise of inequality than suggested by earlier work, which had 
attributed 85% to 110% of this rise to the falling minimum. 
Despite these modest total effects, we estimate that the effect of the minimum 
wage extends further up the wage distribution than would be predicted if the 
minimum wage had a purely mechanical effect on wages (i.e. raising the wage of 
all who earned below it). One interpretation of these significant spillovers is that 
they represent a true wage effect for workers initially earning above the minimum. 
An alternative explanation is that wages for low-wage workers are mismeasured or 
misreported. If a significant share of minimum wage earners report wages in excess 
of the minimum wage, and this measurement error persists in response to changes 
in the minimum, then we would observe changes in percentiles above where the 
minimum wage directly binds in response to changes in the minimum wage. Our 
investigation of this hypothesis in Section IV is unable to reject the null hypothesis 
that all of the apparent effect of the minimum wage on percentiles above the 
minimum is the consequence of measurement error. Accepting this null, the implied 
effect of the minimum wage on the actual wage distribution is even smaller than 
the effect of the minimum wage on the measured wage distribution. 
In net, our analysis suggests that there was a significant expansion in latent lower 
tail inequality over the 1980s, mirroring the expansion of inequality in the upper 
tail. While the minimum wage was certainly a contributing factor to widening lower 
tail inequality—particularly for females—it was not the primary one. 
 
APPENDIX 
A. DATA APPENDIX 
As described in section I, our primary data comes from individual responses from 
the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS MORG) for 
each year. For each year, we pool the monthly observations.  We use CPS variables 
(e.g. weekly and hourly wages) as cleaned by the Unicon Research Corporation.  
Specifically, the hourly wage variable is ERNHR, the weekly wage variable is 
WKUSERN, ERNWKC, or ERNWK (depending on the year), and the weekly 
hours variable is HOURS. The respondent weight variable that we use is 
ERNWGT.  As mentioned in the text, in our calculations we weight by a 
respondent’s earnings weight (ERNWGT) multiplied by hours worked (HOURS), 
although our findings are roughly unchanged if we use ERNWGT instead. 
The primary outcome we construct from CPS data is a respondent’s wage.  For 
those who report being paid by the hour we take their hourly wage to be their 
reported hourly wage; otherwise we calculate the hourly wage as weekly earnings 
divided by hours worked in the prior week. We multiply top-coded values by 1.5. 
When computing percentiles within a state, we Winsorize the top two percentiles 
of the wage distribution in each state, year, sex grouping (male, female or pooled) 
by assigning the 97th percentile value to the 98th and 99th percentiles. Our sample 
includes individuals age 18-64, and we exclude self-employed individuals as well 
as respondents with wage data imputed by the BLS.  
 
B. PROOF OF RESULT 1 
The density of wages among workers whose true percentile is 𝑝𝑝∗ is given by 
𝑔𝑔�𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝∗)�. The density of observed wages is simply the average of 𝑔𝑔(⋅) across 
true percentiles: 
(B1) 𝑓𝑓(𝑤𝑤) = ∫ 𝑔𝑔�𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝∗)�𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝∗10 . 
 
And the cumulative density function for observed wages is given by: 
(B2) 𝐹𝐹(𝑤𝑤) = ∫ ∫ 𝑔𝑔�𝑤𝑤 −𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝∗)�𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝∗𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑10𝑤𝑤−∞ . 
 
This can be inverted to give an implicit equation for the wage at observed 
percentile 𝑝𝑝, 𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝): 
(B3) 𝑝𝑝 = ∫ ∫ 𝑔𝑔�𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝∗)�𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝∗𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑10𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝)−∞ . 
 
By differentiating this expression with respect to the minimum wage, we obtain 
the following key result: 
(B4) �∫ 𝑔𝑔[𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝) − 𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝∗)]𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝∗10 � 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝)𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚 + ∫ ∫ 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[𝑥𝑥−𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝∗)]𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝∗𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑10𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝)−∞ = 0 
 
 
Now we have that:  
(B5) 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[𝑥𝑥−𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝∗)]
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚




Which, from (B1) is:  
(B6) 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[𝑥𝑥−𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝∗)]
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚
= −𝑔𝑔[𝑑𝑑 − 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚] 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓   𝑝𝑝∗ ≤ ?̂?𝑝(𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚)0 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓  𝑝𝑝∗ > ?̂?𝑝(𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚)  
 






The numerator is the fraction of workers who are really paid the minimum wage 
but are observed with wage 𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝) because they have measurement error equal to [𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝) − 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚]. Hence the numerator divided by the denominator is the fraction of 
workers observed at wage  𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝) who are really paid the minimum wage. 
 
C. PROOF OF RESULT 2 
One implication of (B7) is the following. Suppose we are interested in the effect 





𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 = ∫ 𝑝𝑝�𝜕𝜕[𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝)−𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚]
𝑓𝑓[𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝)]1010 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 
 
Change the variable of integration to 𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝). We will have: 
(C2) 𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤′(𝑝𝑝)𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 = 1
𝑓𝑓[𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝)]𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 
 
Hence (C1) becomes:  
(C3) 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤�
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚
= ?̂?𝑝 ∫ 𝑔𝑔[𝑤𝑤 −𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚]𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤 = ?̂?𝑝∞−∞  
 
That is, the elasticity of average log wages with respect to the log minimum is 
just the size of the true spike. 
 
D. ESTIMATION PROCEDURE FOR THE MEASUREMENT ERROR 
MODEL 
We first derive the proportion of workers reporting sub-minimum wages, which 
we denote by 𝑍𝑍. Assuming full compliance with the minimum wage statute, all of 
these subminimum wages will represent negative measurement error. We therefore 
have: 
(D1) 𝑍𝑍 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾) × �0.5?̂?𝑝 + ∫ 𝐺𝐺�𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤∗(𝑝𝑝∗)�𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝∗1𝑝𝑝� � 
 
The symmetry assumption implies that half of those at the true spike who report 
wages with error will report wages below the minimum, and this is reflected as the 
first term in the bracketed expression (0.5?̂?𝑝). In addition, for workers paid above 
the minimum, some subset will report with sufficiently negative error that their 
reported wage will fall below the minimum, thus also contributing to the mass 
below the statutory minimum. This contributor to 𝑍𝑍 is captured by the second term 
in the bracketed expression. 




To keep notation to a minimum we suppress variation across states and time, 
though this is incorporated into the estimation. The true wage is given by: 
(D3) w=max(𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚,𝑤𝑤∗) 
 
And the observed wage is given by: 
(D4) 𝑣𝑣=𝑤𝑤+𝐷𝐷ε 
 
Where D is a binary variable taking the value 0 if the true wage is observed and 
1 if it is not. We assume that: 
(D5) Pr(𝐷𝐷=1)=1‐γ 
 
We assume that  is normally distributed according to:  





We choose to parameterize the variance of the error process as proportional to 
the variance of the true latent wage distribution as this will be convenient later. We 
later show that 𝜌𝜌 is the correlation coefficient between the true latent wage and the 
observed latent wage when mis-reported—a lower value of 𝜌𝜌 implies more 
measurement error so leads to a lower correlation between the true and observed 
wage. We assume that (𝑤𝑤∗,𝐷𝐷, 𝜀𝜀) are all mutually independent.  
Our estimation procedure uses maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters 
of the measurement error model. There are three types of entries in the likelihood 
function: 
(i) those with an observed wage equal to the minimum wage 
(ii) those with an observed wage above the minimum wage 
(iii) those with an observed wage below the minimum wage 
ε
Let us consider the contribution to the likelihood function for these three groups 
in turn. 
Those Observed to be Paid the Minimum Wage 
With the assumptions made above, the ‘true’ size of the spike is given by: 




And the size of the observed ‘spike’ is given by:  




This is the contribution to the likelihood function for those paid the minimum 
wage. 
Those Observed to be Paid Below the Minimum Wage 
Now let us consider the contribution to the likelihood function for those who 
report being paid below paid the minimum wage. We need to work out the density 
function of actual observed wages w, where 𝑤𝑤 < 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚. None of those who report 
their correct wages (i.e. have 𝐷𝐷 = 0) will report a sub-minimum wage, so we need 
only consider those who mis-report their wage (i.e. those with 𝐷𝐷 = 1). Some of 
these will have a true wage equal to the minimum and some will have a true wage 
above the minimum. Those who are truly paid the minimum will have measurement 
error equal to (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚) so, using (D6) and (D7) the contribution to the likelihood 
function will be:  









 Now, consider those whose true wage is above the minimum but have a 
measurement error that pushes their observed wage below the minimum. For this 
group, their observed wage is below the minimum and their latent wage is above 
the minimum. The fraction of those who mis-report who are in this category is, with 
some abuse of the concept of probability: 
(D10) Pr (𝑣𝑣 = 𝑤𝑤,𝑤𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚) 
 
Define: 
(D11) 𝑣𝑣∗ = 𝑤𝑤∗ + ε 
 
Which is what the observed wage would be if there was no minimum wage and 
they misreport i.e. 𝐷𝐷 = 1. 
 










�~𝑁𝑁 ��𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇� ,𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤2 �1 𝜌𝜌2� 11 1��  
 
This implies the following:  
(D13) � 𝑣𝑣
∗
𝑤𝑤∗ − 𝜌𝜌2𝑣𝑣∗�~𝑁𝑁 �� 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜌𝜌2)� ,𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤2 �1 𝜌𝜌2� 11 1 − 𝜌𝜌2�� 
  
Which is an orthogonalization that will be convenient. 
Now for those paid above the minimum but whose wage is misreported, the true 
wage is w* and the observed wage is v*. So:  
 
(D14) Pr(𝑣𝑣=w, 𝑤𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚) = Pr (𝑣𝑣∗ = 𝑤𝑤,𝑤𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚) 
 = Pr (𝑣𝑣∗ = 𝑤𝑤,𝑤𝑤∗ − 𝜌𝜌2𝑣𝑣∗ > 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚 − 𝜌𝜌2𝑤𝑤) 










where the third line uses the independence of (D13). 
 
Putting together (D9) and (D14), the fraction of the population observed to be 
paid at a wage 𝑤𝑤  below the minimum is given by: 











Those Observed to be Paid Above the Minimum Wage 
Now let us consider the fraction observed above the minimum wage. These 
workers might be one of three types: 
(i) Those really paid the minimum wage who misreport a wage above the 
minimum 
(ii) Those really paid above the minimum wage who do not misreport 
(iii) Those really paid above the minimum wage, who do misreport, but 
do not report a sub-minimum wage. 
For those who are truly paid the minimum wage and have a misreported wage, a 








Those who do not misreport and truly have a wage above the minimum will be:  




Now, consider those whose true wage is above the minimum but who misreport. 
For this group we know their observed latent wage is above the minimum and that 
their true latent wage is above the minimum. The fraction who are in this category 
is: 
(D18) Pr(𝑤𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚, 𝑣𝑣∗ > 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚) 
 
Now: 
(D19) Pr(𝑤𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚, 𝑣𝑣∗ > 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚) = 
 = 1 − Pr(𝑤𝑤∗ < 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚) − Pr(𝑣𝑣∗ < 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚) + Pr (𝑤𝑤∗ < 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚, 𝑣𝑣∗ < 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚) 











Where the final term is the cumulative density function of the bivariate normal 
distribution. Putting together (D16), (D17), and (D19) the fraction of the population 
observed to be paid above the minimum is given by:  
(D20) (1 − 𝛾𝛾) ∙ 
�




This is the contribution to the likelihood function for those paid above the 
minimum. 
There are three parameters in this model (𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤,𝛾𝛾,𝜌𝜌). These parameters may vary 
with state or time. In the paper we have already documented how the variance in 
observed wages varies across state and time so it is important to allow for this 
variation. Nevertheless, for ease of computation our estimates assume that (𝛾𝛾,𝜌𝜌) 
only vary across time and are constant across states. 
We estimate the parameters in two steps. We first use the information on the 
shape of the wage distribution above the median to obtain an estimate of the median 
and variance of the latent observed wage distribution for each state/year.25 This 
assumes that the latent distribution above the median is unaffected by the minimum 
25 To estimate this, we assume that the latent wage distribution for each state/year is log normal and can be summarized 
by its median and variance, so that 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡∗ (𝑝𝑝) = 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹−1(𝑝𝑝), where 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the log median and 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the variance. We then 
assume that the minimum wage has no effect on the shape of the wage distribution above the median, so that upper-tail 
percentiles are estimates of the latent distribution. To estimate 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  , we pool the 50th through 75th log wage percentiles, 
regress the log value of the percentile on the inverse CDF of the standard normal distribution, and allowing the intercept 
(𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) and coefficient (𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) to vary by state and year (and including state-specific time trends in both the intercept and 
coefficient). Since we assume the wage distribution is unaffected by the minimum wage between the 50th and 75th 
percentiles, the distribution between the 50th and 75th percentiles, combined with our parametric assumptions, allows us to 
infer the shape of the wage distribution for lower percentiles. We have experimented with the percentiles used to estimate 
the latent wage distribution and the results are not very sensitive to the choices made. 
 
 
wage. It also assumes that latent observed wage distribution is normal, which is not 
consistent with our measurement error model (recall our model assumes that the 
latent observed wage distribution is a mixture of two normal, i.e. those who report 
their wage correctly and those who do not). This does not affect the estimate of the 
median but does affect the interpretation of the variance. Here we show how to map 
between this estimate of the variance and the parameters of our measurement error 
model. 
Our measurement error model implies that the log wage at percentile 𝑝𝑝, 𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝) 
satisfies the following equation: 
(D21) 𝑝𝑝=γΦ�𝑤𝑤(𝑝𝑝)−𝜇𝜇
𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤




Differentiating this we obtain the following equation for 𝑤𝑤′(𝑝𝑝): 












Our estimated model which assumes a single normal distribution uses, instead, 








And our estimation procedure provides an estimate of 𝜎𝜎. Equating the two terms 
we have the following expression for the relationship between 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤 and 𝜎𝜎: 







If the values of the density functions are similar then one can approximate this 
relationship by:  
(D25) 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤 = 𝜎𝜎[𝛾𝛾 + 𝜌𝜌(1 − 𝛾𝛾)] 
 
This is an approximation, but simulation of the model for the parameters we 
estimate suggest it is a good approximation. This implies that we can write all 
elements of the likelihood function as functions of: 
(D26) 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = �𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚−𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 � 
 
That is, 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  is the standardized deviation of the minimum from the median using 
the estimate of the observed variance obtained as described above from step 1 of 
the estimation procedure. 
In the second step, we estimate the parameters (𝜌𝜌, 𝛾𝛾) using maximum-likelihood, 
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TABLE 1A - SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR BINDINGNESS OF STATE AND FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGES 

































   
   
   
 (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) 
            
1979  1  5.0 28.0 0.13 -0.38  2.0 10.5 0.05 -0.64 
1980  1  6.0 24.0 0.13 -0.40  2.5 10.0 0.06 -0.65 
1981  1  5.0 24.0 0.13 -0.41  1.5 9.0 0.06 -0.68 
1982  1  5.0 21.5 0.11 -0.48  2.0 8.0 0.05 -0.71 
1983  1  3.5 17.5 0.10 -0.51  2.0 8.0 0.05 -0.73 
1984  1  2.5 15.5 0.09 -0.54  1.5 7.5 0.04 -0.73 
1985  2  2.0 14.5 0.08 -0.56  1.0 6.5 0.04 -0.74 
1986  5  2.0 16.0 0.07 -0.59  1.0 6.5 0.03 -0.74 
1987  6  2.0 14.0 0.06 -0.60  1.0 6.0 0.03 -0.73 
1988 10  2.0 12.5 0.06 -0.60  1.0 6.0 0.03 -0.72 
1989 12  1.0 12.5 0.05 -0.61  1.0 5.0 0.03 -0.72 
1990 11  1.0 14.0 0.05 -0.58  0.5 6.0 0.03 -0.72 
1991  4  1.5 18.5 0.07 -0.58  0.5 9.0 0.04 -0.71 
1992  7  2.0 14.0 0.07 -0.58  1.0 6.5 0.04 -0.72 
1993  7  2.5 11.0 0.06 -0.59  1.0 5.0 0.03 -0.73 
1994  8  2.5 11.0 0.06 -0.61  1.0 4.5 0.03 -0.71 
1995  9  2.0 9.5 0.05 -0.61  0.5 4.5 0.03 -0.71 
1996 11  2.0 12.5 0.05 -0.61  1.0 7.0 0.03 -0.71 
1997 10  2.5 14.5 0.06 -0.60  1.0 7.5 0.04 -0.69 
1998  7  2.5 11.5 0.06 -0.58  1.0 7.0 0.04 -0.69 
1999 10  2.5 11.0 0.05 -0.58  1.0 5.5 0.03 -0.69 
2000 10  2.0 9.5 0.05 -0.59  1.0 6.0 0.03 -0.68 
2001 10  2.0 8.5 0.05 -0.60  1.0 5.5 0.03 -0.69 
2002 11  1.5 9.0 0.04 -0.60  1.0 6.0 0.03 -0.70 
2003 11  1.5 9.0 0.04 -0.61  0.5 5.0 0.03 -0.69 
2004 12  1.5 7.5 0.04 -0.63  1.0 5.0 0.03 -0.70 
2005 15  1.5 8.5 0.04 -0.64  1.0 5.0 0.02 -0.71 
2006 19  1.5 9.5 0.04 -0.64  0.5 6.0 0.02 -0.70 
2007 30  1.5 10.0 0.05 -0.63  0.5 6.0 0.03 -0.70 
2008 31  2.0 13.0 0.06 -0.64  1.0 6.5 0.04 -0.71 
2009 26  2.5 10.5 0.06 -0.64  1.0 6.0 0.04 -0.74 
2010 15  3.5 9.5 0.06 -0.64  2.0 6.5 0.04 -0.73 
2011 19  3.0 10.5 0.06 -0.65  1.5 8.0 0.04 -0.72 
2012 19   3.0 9.5 0.06 -0.66   1.5 7.0 0.04 -0.74 
Notes: Column 1 displays the number of states with a minimum that exceeds the federal minimum for at least 6 months of the 
year. Columns 2 and 6, and 3 and 7, display estimates of the lowest and highest percentile at which the minimum wage binds 
across states (DC is excluded). The binding percentile is estimated as the highest percentile in the annual distribution of wages at 
which the minimum wage binds (rounded to the nearest half of a percentile), where the annual distribution includes only those 
months for which the minimum wage was equal to its modal value for the year.  Columns 4 and 8 display the share of hours 
worked for wages at or below the minimum wage.  Columns 5 and 9 display the weighted average value of the log(p10)-log(p50) 




TABLE 1B - SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR BINDINGNESS OF STATE AND FEDERA  
MINIMUM WAGES 






















 (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
1979  1  3.5 17.0 0.08 -0.58 
1980  1  4.0 15.5 0.09 -0.59 
1981  1  2.5 14.5 0.09 -0.60 
1982  1  3.5 12.5 0.07 -0.63 
1983  1  3.0 11.5 0.07 -0.65 
1984  1  2.0 10.5 0.06 -0.67 
1985  2  1.5 9.5 0.06 -0.69 
1986  5  1.5 10.0 0.05 -0.70 
1987  6  1.5 9.0 0.04 -0.70 
1988 10  1.5 8.0 0.04 -0.69 
1989 12  1.0 7.0 0.04 -0.68 
1990 11  0.5 9.0 0.04 -0.67 
1991  4  1.0 12.5 0.05 -0.67 
1992  7  1.5 9.5 0.05 -0.67 
1993  7  1.5 7.5 0.04 -0.68 
1994  8  2.0 7.5 0.04 -0.69 
1995  9  1.5 6.0 0.04 -0.68 
1996 11  1.5 9.5 0.04 -0.67 
1997 10  1.5 10.0 0.05 -0.66 
1998  7  2.0 8.0 0.05 -0.65 
1999 10  2.0 7.0 0.04 -0.65 
2000 10  1.5 7.5 0.04 -0.65 
2001 10  1.5 6.5 0.04 -0.66 
2002 11  1.5 7.0 0.03 -0.66 
2003 11  1.5 6.5 0.03 -0.66 
2004 12  1.5 6.0 0.03 -0.68 
2005 15  1.5 6.5 0.03 -0.68 
2006 19  1.0 7.5 0.03 -0.68 
2007 30  1.5 7.5 0.04 -0.68 
2008 31  1.0 8.5 0.04 -0.69 
2009 26  2.0 8.0 0.05 -0.71 
2010 15  3.0 7.5 0.05 -0.70 
2011 19  2.5 9.0 0.05 -0.69 
2012 19   2.0 8.0 0.05 -0.71 
Notes: See text at bottom of Table 1a. 
 
  
 TABLE 2A: OLS AND 2SLS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOG(P)-LOG(P50) AND LOG(MIN. 
WAGE)-LOG(P50), FOR SELECT PERCENTILES OF GIVEN WAGE DISTRIBUTION, 1979 - 2012 
     OLS 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS Lee Spec 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
A. Females 
      
P(5) 0.44*** 0.54*** 0.32*** 0.39*** 0.63*** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
P(10) 0.27*** 0.46*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.52*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
P(20) 0.12*** 0.29*** 0.10** 0.07** 0.29*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
P(30) 0.07*** 0.23*** 0.02 0.04 0.15*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
P(40) 0.04** 0.17*** -0.01 0.03 0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
P(75) 0.09*** 0.24*** -0.03 0.01 -0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
P(90) 0.15*** 0.34*** -0.02 0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Var. of log 
wage 
0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.09 -0.20*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) 
      
B. Males 
      
P(5) 0.25*** 0.43*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.55*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
P(10) 0.12*** 0.34*** 0.04 0.05* 0.38*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
P(20) 0.06** 0.24*** 0.01 0.02 0.21*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
P(30) 0.05*** 0.19*** 0.01 0.00 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
P(40) 0.06*** 0.15*** 0.04* 0.02 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
P(75) 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.00 0.02 0.09** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
P(90) 0.16*** 0.30*** 0.02 0.03 0.14** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
Var. of log 
wage 
0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 -0.13** 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
      
Levels / 
First-Diff Levels FD Levels FD Levels 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
State trends Yes No Yes No No 
            
Notes: See text at bottom of Table 2B. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
    * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
TABLE 2B: OLS AND 2SLS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOG(P)-LOG(P50) AND LOG(MIN. 
WAGE)-LOG(P50), FOR SELECT PERCENTILES OF POOLED WAGE DISTRIBUTION, 1979 - 2012 
     OLS 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS Lee Spec 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
C. Males and Females Pooled 
      
P(5) 0.35*** 0.45*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.62*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
P(10) 0.18*** 0.35*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.44*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
P(20) 0.09*** 0.23*** 0.07*** 0.04 0.26*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
P(30) 0.06*** 0.20*** 0.03 0.01 0.14*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
P(40) 0.05*** 0.16*** 0.03** 0.02 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
P(75) 0.11*** 0.22*** 0.00 0.02 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
P(90) 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.01 0.02 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Var. of log 
wage 
0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.18*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
Levels / 
First-Diff Levels FD Levels FD Levels 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
State trends Yes No Yes No No 
      
Notes: N=1700 for levels estimation, N=1650 for first-differenced estimation. Sample 
period is 1979-2012.  For all but the last row, the dependent variable is log(p)-log(p50), 
where p is the indicated percentile.  For the last row, the dependent variable is the variance 
of log wage.  Estimates are the marginal effects of log(min. wage)-log(p50), evaluated at 
its hours-weighted average across states and years. The last row are estimates of the 
marginal effects of log(min. wage)-log(p50), evaluated at its hours-weighted average 
across states and years.  Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parenthesis. 
Regressions are weighted by the sum of individuals' reported weekly hours worked 
multiplied by CPS sampling weights.  For 2SLS specifications, the effective minimum 
and its square are instrumented by the log of the minimum, the square of the log 
minimum, and the log minimum interacted with the average real log median for the state 
over the sample.  For the first-differenced specification, the instruments are first-
differenced equivalents. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
    * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
   
TABLE 3: ACTUAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL CHANGES IN LOG(P50/10) BETWEEN SELECTED YEARS: CHANGES IN LOG POINT  
(100 X LOG CHANGE) 
   2SLS Counterfactuals  OLS Counterfactuals 
 Observed 
Change 
 Levels FE First Diffs  Levels, No FE 
  1979-2012 1979-2012  1979-2012 1979-1991 
 (1)   (2) (3)   (4) (5) 
        
 A. 1979 - 1989 
        
Females 24.6  11.3*** 15.1***  2.9 4.3*** 
   (3.7) (1.8)  (2.0) (1.3) 
Males 2.5  1.3 1.5  -6.6*** -5.3*** 
   (1.5) (0.9)  (1.4) (1.6) 
Pooled 11.8  6.9*** 8.1***  -1.2 0.0 
   (1.9) (0.8)  (1.3) (1.2) 
        
 B. 1979 - 2012 
        
Females 28.5  14.8*** 18.6***  6.4*** 7.4*** 
   (3.7) (1.8)  (1.9) (1.3) 
Males 7.9  7.1*** 7.2***  3.0*** 3.6*** 
   (1.1) (0.7)  (1.0) (0.9) 
Pooled 11.4  7.0*** 8.0***  1.1 1.8*** 
   (1.6) (0.7)  (1.2) (0.8) 
        
Notes: Estimates represent changes in actual and counterfactual log(p50)-log(p10) between 1979 and 1989, and 
1979 and 2012, measured in log points (100 x log change). Counterfactual wage changes in panels A represents 
counterfactual changes in the 50/10 had the effective minimum wage in 1979 equalled the effective minimum wage 
in 1989 for each state. Counterfactual wage changes in Panel B represent changes had the effective minima in 1979 
and 2012 equaled the effective minimum in 1989. 2SLS counterfactuals (using point estimates from the 1979-2012 
period) are formed using coefficients from estimation reported in columns 3 and 4 of Tables 2a and 2b. OLS 
counterfactual estimates (using point estimates from the 1979-2012 period) are formed using coefficients from 
estimation reported in column 5 of Table 2. Counterfactuals using point estimates from the 1979-1991 period are 
formed using coefficients from analogous regressions for the shorter sample period.  Marginal effects are 
bootstrapped as described in the text; the standard deviation associated with the estimates are reported in 
parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 




APPENDIX TABLE 1 - VARIATION IN STATE MINIMUM WAGES 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
                         
Federal min. wage 2.90 3.10 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 
Alabama             
Alaska 3.40 3.60 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 4.30 
Arizona             
Arkansas             
California           4.25 4.25 
Colorado             
Connecticut          3.75 4.25 4.25 
Delaware             
Florida             
Georgia             
Hawaii          3.85 3.85 3.85 
Idaho             
Illinois             
Indiana             
Iowa            3.85 
Kansas             
Kentucky             
Louisiana             
Maine       3.45 3.55 3.65 3.65 3.75 3.85 
Maryland             
Massachusetts         3.65 3.70 3.75  
Michigan             
Minnesota          3.55 3.85 3.95 
Mississippi             
Missouri             
Montana             
Nebraska             
Nevada             
New Hampshire         3.45 3.55 3.65  
New Jersey             
New Mexico             
New York             
North Carolina             
North Dakota             
Ohio             
Oklahoma             
Oregon            4.25 
Pennsylvania             
Rhode island         3.60 3.83 4.13 4.25 
South Carolina             
South Dakota             
Tennessee             
Texas             
Utah             
Vermont         3.50 3.60 3.70 3.85 
Virginia             
Washington           3.85 3.85 
West Virginia             
Wisconsin             
Wyoming             
             
Notes: Table indicates years in which each state had a state minimum wage that exceeded the federal minimum wage 
for 6 months or more of the year. 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 1 (CONT) - VARIATION IN STATE MINIMUM WAGES 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
               
Fed. min. wage 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.75 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 
Alabama            
Alaska 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.25 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65 
Arizona            
Arkansas            
California       5.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.25 
Colorado            
Connecticut 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.77 5.18 5.65 6.15 6.40 
Delaware      4.65   5.65 5.65 6.15 
Florida            
Georgia            
Hawaii  4.75 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 
Idaho            
Illinois            
Indiana            
Iowa  4.65 4.65 4.65 4.65 4.65      
Kansas            
Kentucky            
Louisiana            
Maine            
Maryland            
Massachusetts      4.75 5.25 5.25 5.25 6.00 6.75 
Michigan            
Minnesota            
Mississippi            
Missouri            
Montana            
Nebraska            
Nevada            
New Hampshire            
New Jersey  5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05     
New Mexico            
New York            
North Carolina            
North Dakota            
Ohio            
Oklahoma            
Oregon 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.50 6.00 6.50 6.50 6.50 
Pennsylvania            
Rhode island 4.45 4.45 4.45 4.45 4.45 4.45 5.15   5.65 6.15 
South Carolina            
South Dakota            
Tennessee            
Texas            
Utah            
Vermont     4.50 4.75 5.00 5.25 5.25 5.75 6.25 
Virginia            
Washington    4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90  5.70 6.50 6.72 
West Virginia            
Wisconsin            
Wyoming            
            
Notes: Table indicates years in which each state had a state minimum wage that exceeded the federal 
minimum wage for 6 months or more of the year. 
  
APPENDIX TABLE 1 (CONT) - VARIATION IN STATE MINIMUM WAGES 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
            
Fed. min. wage 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.85 6.55 7.25 7.25 7.25 
Alabama            
Alaska 5.65 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.75 7.75 7.75 
Arizona      6.75 6.90 7.25  7.35 7.65 
Arkansas      6.25 6.25     
California 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.50 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
Colorado      6.85 7.02 7.28  7.36 7.64 
Connecticut 6.70 6.90 7.10 7.10 7.40 7.65 7.65 8.00 8.25 8.25 8.25 
Delaware 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.65 7.15 7.15    
Florida    6.15 6.40 6.67 6.79 7.21  7.31 7.67 
Georgia            
Hawaii 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.75 7.25 7.25 7.25    
Idaho            
Illinois   5.50 6.50 6.50 7.00 7.63 7.88 8.13 8.25 8.25 
Indiana            
Iowa      6.20 7.25 7.25    
Kansas            
Kentucky            
Louisiana            
Maine 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.35 6.50 6.75 7.00 7.25 7.50 7.50 7.50 
Maryland     6.15 6.15 6.15     
Massachusetts 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.50 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
Michigan      7.05 7.28 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 
Minnesota     6.15 6.15 6.15     
Mississippi            
Missouri      6.50 6.65 7.05    
Montana      6.15 6.25 6.90  7.35 7.65 
Nebraska            
Nevada      6.24 6.59 7.20 7.55 8.25 8.25 
New Hampshire            
New Jersey     6.15 7.15 7.15 7.15    
New Mexico       6.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 
New York    6.00 6.75 7.15 7.15 7.15    
North Carolina      6.15 6.15     
North Dakota            
Ohio      6.85 7.00 7.30 7.30 7.40 7.70 
Oklahoma            
Oregon 6.50 6.90 7.05 7.25 7.50 7.80 7.95 8.40 8.40 8.50 8.80 
Pennsylvania      6.70 7.15 7.15    
Rhode island 6.15 6.15 6.75 6.75 7.10 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 
South Carolina            
South Dakota            
Tennessee            
Texas            
Utah            
Vermont 6.25 6.25 6.75 7.00 7.25 7.53 7.68 8.06 8.06 8.15 8.46 
Virginia            
Washington 6.90 7.01 7.16 7.35 7.63 7.93 8.07 8.55 8.55 8.67 9.04 
West Virginia      6.20 6.90 7.25    
Wisconsin    5.70 6.50 6.50 6.50     
Wyoming            
            
Notes: Table indicates years in which each state had a state minimum wage that exceeded the federal 






APPENDIX TABLE 2: FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATES FOR SPECIFICATIONS THAT INCLUDE YEAR FIXED EFFECTS AND STATE TIME 
TRENDS 
       
C. Males and females  A. Females  B. Males  
















LHS: square of 
log(min)-
log(p50) 
   
   
   
 (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
         
Log (min) 0.30 0.61  1.79*** -2.31***  1.15*** -0.92 
 (0.41) (0.58)  (0.44) (0.80)  (0.40) (0.61) 
Square of log (min) -0.34* 1.32***  -0.82*** 2.59***  -0.61*** 2.01*** 
 (0.18) (0.27)  (0.24) (0.45)  (0.20) (0.32) 
Log (min) × avg. of state 
median 
0.79*** -2.76***  0.49* -2.56***  0.61*** -2.69*** 
(0.14) (0.15)  (0.26) (0.46)  (0.21) (0.29) 
         
F statistics 251*** 362***  370*** 394***  587*** 684*** 
p-value  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
                  
Notes: N=1700. Sample period is 1979-2012.  For columns 1, 3, and 5, the dependent variable is the "effective minimum", 
that is, log(min)-log(p50).  For columns 2, 4, and 6, the dependent variable is the square of the effective minimum.  The 
RHS variables included are the three instruments: the log of the minimum wage, the square of the log min, and the 
interaction between the log of the min multiplied by the average median for the state over the sample.  Also included in 
the regression are year fixed effects, and state-specific trends.  The F-statistic for testing whether the three instruments 
are jointly significant, and associated p-value, are presented at the bottom.  Standard errors clustered at the state level are 
in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 




APPENDIX TABLE 3: OLS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEAN AND TRENDS IN LOG(P60)-LOG(P40) AND LOG(P50)  
 A. Females  B. Males  C. Males and Females 
         
 (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
         
 A. Dep. variable: mean log(p60)-log(p40), 1979-2012 
         
Mean log(p50), 
1979-2012 
0.12***   0.06*   0.11***  
(0.02)   (0.03)   (0.04)  
         
 B. Dep. variable: trend log(p60)-log(p40), 1979-2012 
         
Trend log(p50), 
1979-2012 
 0.16***   0.04   0.15*** 
 (0.06)   (0.07)   (0.06) 
                  
Notes: N=50 (one observation per state).  Observations are wighted by the average hours worked per state.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.  The dependent variable in the top panel is the mean log(p60)-log(p40) for the 
state, over the 1979-2012 period.  The dependent variable in the bottom panel is the linear trend in the log(p60)-
log(p40) for the state, over the 1979-2012 period.  Regressions correspond to plots in Figures 6a and 6b. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 




PANEL A. MINIMUM WAGES AND LOG (P10)-LOG (P50) 
 
PANEL B. MINIMUM WAGES AND LOG (P90)-LOG (P50) 
 
FIGURE 1. TRENDS IN STATE AND FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGES AND LOWER- AND UPPER-TAIL INEQUALITY 
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FIGURE 2. SHARE OF HOURS AT OR BELOW THE MINIMUM WAGE 
Notes: Figure plots estimates of the share of hours worked for reported wages equal to or less than the applicable state or 
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PANEL A. FEMALES – STATE FIXED EFFECTS AND TRENDS 
 
PANEL B. MALES – STATE FIXED EFFECTS AND TRENDS 
 
PANEL C. MALES AND FEMALES – STATE FIXED EFFECTS AND TRENDS 
 
FIGURE 3. OLS ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOG(P)-LOG(P50) AND LOG(MIN)-LOG(P50) AND ITS SQUARE, 
1979-2012 
Notes: Estimates are the marginal effects of log(min. wage)-log(p50), evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. 
wage)-log(p50) across states and years. Observations are state-year observations. 95% confidence interval is represented by 
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PANEL A. FEMALES – 2SLS, STATE FIXED EFFECTS AND TRENDS 
 
PANEL B. MALES –2SLS, STATE FIXED EFFECTS AND TRENDS 
 
PANEL C. MALES AND FEMALES – 2SLS, STATE FIXED EFFECTS AND TRENDS 
 
FIGURE 4A. 2SLS ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOG(P)-LOG(P50) AND LOG(MIN)-LOG(P50) AND ITS SQUARE, 
1979-2012 
Notes: Estimates are the marginal effects of log(min. wage)-log(p50), evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. 
wage)-log(p50) across states and years. Observations are state-year observations. 95% confidence interval is represented by 
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PANEL A. FEMALES – 2SLS, FIRST-DIFFERENCED AND STATE FIXED EFFECTS 
 
PANEL B. MALES –2SLS, FIRST-DIFFERENCED AND STATE FIXED EFFECTS 
 
PANEL C. MALES AND FEMALES – 2SLS, FIRST-DIFFERENCED AND STATE FIXED EFFECTS 
 
FIGURE 4B. 2SLS ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOG(P)-LOG(P50) AND LOG(MIN)-LOG(P50) IN FIRST-
DIFFERENCES, 1979-2012 
Notes: Estimates are the marginal effects of log (min. wage)-log (p50), evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. 
wage)-log(p50) across states and years. Observations are state-year observations. 95% confidence interval is represented by 
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PANEL A. FEMALES – OLS, NO STATE FIXED EFFECTS 
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PANEL C. MALES AND FEMALES – OLS, NO STATE FIXED EFFECTS 
 
FIGURE 5. 2SLS ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOG(P)-LOG(P50) AND LOG(MIN)-LOG(P50) AND ITS SQUARE 
USING LEE (1999) SPECIFICATION, 1979-2012 
Notes: Estimates are the marginal effects of log(min. wage)-log(p50), evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. 
wage)-log(p50) across states and years. Observations are state-year observations. 95% confidence interval is represented by 
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FIGURE 6A. OLS ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEAN LOG(P60)-LOG(P40) AND MEAN LOG(P50), 1979-2012 
Notes: Estimates correspond with regressions from Appendix Table 3.  The figures show the cross-state relationship between 
the average log (p60)-log(p40) and log(p50) between 1979 and 2012.  Alaska, which tends to be an outlier, is dropped for 
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FIGURE 6B. OLS ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TREND LOG (P60)-LOG (P40) AND TREND LOG(P50), 1979-2012 
Notes: Estimates correspond with regressions from Appendix Table 3.  The figures show the cross-state relationship between 
the trend in log (p60)-log(p40) and the trend in log(p50) between 1979 and 2012.  Alaska, which tends to be an outlier, is 
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FIGURE 7. 2SLS ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOG(P)-LOG(P50) AND LOG(MIN)–LOG(P50) OVER VARIOUS TIME 
PERIODS (MALES AND FEMALES) 
Notes: Estimates are the marginal effects of log(min. wage)-log(p50), evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. 
wage)-log(p50) across states and years. Observations are state-year observations. 95% confidence interval is represented by 
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FIGURE 8. ACTUAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL CHANGE IN LOG(P)-LOG(P50) DISTRIBUTION BY SEX 
Notes: Plots represent the actual and counterfactual changes in the 5th through 95th percentiles of the male wage distribution. 
Counterfactual changes are calculated by adjusting the 1979 wage distributions by the value of states' effective minima in 
1989 using coefficients from OLS regressions without state fixed effects (column 5 of table 2) and 2SLS regressions with 
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FIGURE 9. ACTUAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL CHANGE IN LOG(P)-LOG(P50) MALE AND FEMALE POOLED DISTRIBUTION 
Notes: Plots represent the actual and counterfactual changes in the 5th through 95th percentiles of the male and female pooled 
wage distribution. Counterfactual changes in Panel A are calculated by adjusting the 1979 wage distributions by the value of 
states' effective minima in 1989 using coefficients from OLS regressions (column 5 of table 2) and 2SLS regressions 
(columns 3 and 4 of table 2).  Counterfactual changes in Panel B are calculated by adjusting both the 1979 and 2012 wage 
distributions by the value of states' effective minima in 1989 using coefficients from OLS regressions (column 5 of table 2) 





























0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile
Actual change Cntfct. change, no sta te FE





























0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile
Actual change Cntfct. change, no sta te FE
Cntfct. change, state time trends Cntfct. change, FD
PANEL A. FEMALES  
 
PANEL B. MALES  
 
PANEL C. MALES AND FEMALES  
 
FIGURE 10. COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE ON THE MEAN AND DENSITY AT THE TRUE SPIKE 
Notes: Mean effects represent the average marginal effects of the minimum wage (weighted across states), estimated from 
2SLS regressions of log(mean) on the effective minimum and its square, year and state fixed effects, state time trends, and 
the log median, where the effective minimum and its square are instrumented as in the earlier analysis. The bounds for the 
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